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The Probate of Lost Wills: In re Kleefeld
I. Introduction
It is not uncommon that an original will is lost or destroyed
while in the possession of the testator' or in the custody of a
third party.2 The will may have been lost or destroyed due to
the negligence of the testator himself, without an intention to
revoke the will,' or through the negligent or fraudulent act of
another.4 It may also have been destroyed by a catastrophe such
as fire or flood.6
In New York, section 1407 of the Surrogate's Court Proce-
dure Act (SCPA 1407),6 allows probate of a lost or destroyed will
if the proponent7 proves contents of the will, its due execution,
1. See In re Yanover, 16 Misc. 2d 128, 182, N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County
1959); In re Breckwoldt, 170 Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939); In
re Shlevin, 157 Misc. 40, 283 N.Y.S. 377 (Sur. Ct. Richmond County 1935).
2. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961); In re
Granacher, 174 N.Y. 504, 66 N.E. 1109 (1903); In re Juriga, 140 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sur. Ct.
Queens County 1955); In re Bohnson, 203 Misc. 116, 115 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1951).
3. If the testator destroys his will because he wishes to revoke it, it ceases to exist as
a valid will and cannot be admitted to probate. If the testator failed to make a new will,
he will then have died intestate. When a will is destroyed by the testator without an
intent to revoke, or is destroyed by a third party without the testator's knowledge or
direction, it continues to exist as a valid will. It can then be admitted to probate if it is
proved that an original will was executed and it was not destroyed by the testator with
the intent to revoke it. 2A WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATES' CotmrS § 179 (6th ad.
1982); 2 JESSUP-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTIcE IN THE SURROGATES' COURTS IN THE STATE
OF NEW YORK § 1157 (1947); H. HARRIS, ESTATES PRAcrICE GUIDE § 240 (1939).
4. See, e.g., In re Breckwoldt, 170 Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1939) (original will destroyed by testator's maid while cleaning closet).
5. In the following cases, the will was destroyed by fire while in the possession of the
attorney-draftsman. In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County
1977); In re Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 1961).
See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 24 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961) (original will
destroyed during bombing raid in Germany while in possession of custodian).
6. N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1407 (McKinney 1971) which became effective Sep-
tember 1, 1967, replacing SURR. CT. AT § 143 (McKinney 1921). See 2A WARREN'S H A-
TON ON SURROGATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed. 1982). See infra text accompanying note 16.
7. The proponent of a will is the party who offers it for probate. BLACK'S LAW Vhc-
TIONARY 1097 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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and absence of revocation by the testator.8 In In re Kleefeld,9
the New York Court of Appeals disallowed probate of a lost will
when the proponent failed to strictly comply with the eviden-
tiary requirements for proof of contents under SCPA 1407.10
The majority determined that the statute should be strictly con-
strued and not alterable by judicial interpretation" in order to
effectuate the primary purpose of the statute's evidentiary re-
quirements to prevent the admission of fraudulent wills to
probate. 2
Part II of this note discusses the legislative history of SCPA
1407 and the judicial interpretations given to its provisions. Part
III presents the factual background of Kleefeld and discusses
the opinions of the Surrogate's Court, the appellate division, and
the court of appeals. Part IV analyzes the court of appeals hold-
ing. Part V concludes that although the Kleefeld court's con-
struction of SCPA 1407 places a heavy burden of proof on pro-
ponents of lost wills and will make admission to probate a more
difficult procedure in the future,' 3 it is a correct interpretation of
the statute as mandated by public policy considerations.
II. Background
At common law, a lost will was admitted to probate if the
proponent proved the contents of the will, its due execution, and
the absence of revocation by the testator. 4 In New York, as in
most other jurisdictions,' the common law has been codified.
SCPA 1407 provides that:
A lost or destroyed will may be admitted to probate only if
(1) It is established that the will has not been revoked.
(2) Execution of the will is proved in the manner required for
8. 2A WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed. 1982).
9. 55 N.Y.2d 253, 433 N.E.2d 521, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1982).
10. Id. at 257, 433 N.E.2d at 523, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
11. Id. at 259, 433 N.E.2d at 524, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
12. Id.
13. Holding that strict statutory construction was necessary, the court denied pro-
bate to the lost will when the evidentiary requirements for proof of contents under
SCPA 1407 were not precisely adhered to. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
14. A. Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills, 24 Nza. L. REv. 283, 283 (1945); Note, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 168, 168 (1962); Note, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 182, 183 (1961).
15. For a discussion of the probate of lost wills under the various state statutes, see
Note, 29 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 444 (1954).
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the probate of an existing will, and
(3) All of the provisions of the will are clearly and distinctly
proved by each of at least 2 credible witnesses or by 1 witness and
a copy or draft of the will proved to be true and complete."
When the foregoing requirements are met, the proponent is
in the same position as if he were offering an original will to
probate. 17
Allowing probate of a lost or destroyed will prevents the
frustration of testamentary intent that results from requiring in-
testacy for a missing but otherwise valid will.' e Admittance of
fraudulent wills to probate is equally to be avoided, and, where
the original will is missing, the possibility of fraudulent admis-
sion increases significantly.I Therefore, although New York pro-
vides the opportunity to admit lost or destroyed wills to probate,
the standard of proof required for admittance is stringent,20 with
the burden of proof falling entirely on the proponent of the
will.21
16. See supra note 6.
17. See 2A WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed. 1982); H.
HARRIS, ESTATES PRAcTICE GUIDE § 240 (1939); infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
18. In re Hughson, 97 Misc. 2d 427, 429, 411 N.Y.S.2d 839, 841 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1978):
The apparent alternative to probating the 1968 [lost] will is intestacy, a result
obviously not intended by the testatrix... [C]ertainly, it is the court's obligation
to avoid intestacy if possible, and to carry out, within the realm of possibility, the
intent of the deceased....
Id. at 429, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
See Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866) (court develops the concept of construc-
tive fraud to avoid intestacy). See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of constructive fraud;
19. "Such a statute [lost wills statutes] serves as a protection against the ready set-
ting up by oral evidence of an allegedly lost will which is actually spurious." Note, 32
CALIF. L. REV. 221, 221 (1944).
20. See Kahn v. Hoes, 14 Misc. 63, 35 N.Y.S. 273 (1895):
Experience, however, has demonstrated the necessity of providing for the
cases where wills which had been duly executed were lost . . . [b]ut in so doing
the legislature has also sought in some measure to provide against the dangerous
consequences imminent upon this relaxation of the rule [for probate of original
existing wills] by prescribing a special quality of proof in such cases.
Id. at 65, 35 N.Y.S. at 274.
21. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961); In re
Sheldon, 158 A.D. 843, 144 N.Y.S. 94 (3d Dep't 1913); In re Pardy, 161 Misc. 77, 291
N.Y.S. 969 (Sur. Ct. Clinton County 1936); In re Shlevin, 157 Misc. 40, 283 N.Y.S. 377
(Sur. Ct. Richmond County 1935); In re Luby, 144 Misc. 900, 260 N.Y.S. 541 (Sur. Ct.
Rensselaer County 1932); 2A WARRN'S HEATON ON SURROoATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed.
1983]
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SCPA 140722 replaced the provisions formerly found in sec-
tion 143 of the Surrogate's Court Act (SCA 143),23 under which
many lost wills cases were decided. 24 The first evidentiary re-
quirement of SCA 143 permitted a lost or destroyed will to be
admitted to probate upon proof that "the will was in existence
at the time of the testator's death, or was fraudulently destroyed
in his lifetime .... ,,25
Under common law, when a will was last seen in the posses-
sion of the testator and could not be located after his death, a
presumption arose that he destroyed the will animo revocandi.2'
The presumption arose when the will was in the testator's pos-
session because it was then under his control and its non-exis-
tence was presumed to be the result of his intentional destruc-
tion. The first evidentiary requirement of SCA 143 allowed the
proponent to overcome the presumption of revocation by prov-
ing that the will was in existence at the time of the testator's
1982); H. HARRIS, ESTATES PAcTic GUIDE § 240 (1939).
22. See supra note 6 and text accompanying note 16.
23. N.Y. SURR. CT. AcT § 143 (McKinney 1921), was enacted in 1920 and replaced
section 1865 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), the 1830 codification of
the common law. In re Dorrity, 118 Misc. 725, 726, 194 N.Y.S. 573, 574 (Sur. Ct. West-
chester County 1922). N.Y. SURE. CT. AcT § 143 (McKinney 1921) provides that:
A lost or destroyed will can be admitted to probate in a surrogate's court, but
only in case the will was in existence at the time the testator's death, or was
fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime, and its provisions are clearly and distinctly
proved by at least two credible witnesses, a correct copy or draft being equivalent
to one witness.
Id. The language of the SCA 143 was almost identical to CCP 1865. In re Granacher 74
A.D. 567, 569, 177 N.Y.S. 748, 750 (4th Dep't 1902).
24. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961); In re
Staiger, 243 N.Y. 468, 154 N.E. 312 (1926); In re Robinson, 257 A.D. 405, 13 N.Y.S.2d
324 (1st Dep't 1939); In re Yanover, 16 Misc. 2d 128, 182 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County 1959); In re Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 162 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County
1956); In re Breckwoldt, 170 Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939); In
re Musacchio, 146 Misc. 626, 262 N.Y.S. 616 (Sur. Ct. Madison County 1933).
25. N.Y. SURE. CT. AcT § 143 (McKinney 1921).
26. Animo Revocandi: with intention to revoke. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (rev.
5th ed. 1979).
See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961); In re Staiger,
243 N.Y. 468, 154 N.E. 312 (1927); In re Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 60 N.E. 442 (1901);
Collyer v. Collyer, 10 N.Y. 481, 18 N.E. 110 (1888); In re Millens, 30 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sur.
Ct. Ulster County 1941), affd mem., 264 A.D. 936, 36 N.Y.S.2d 27 (3d Dep't 1942), af['d
mem., 291 N.Y. 613, 50 N.E.2d 1014 (1943); In re Robinson, 257 A.D. 405, 13 N.Y.S.2d
324 (4th Dep't 1939); Note, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 168, 170 (1962).
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death2 7 or that it was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime.2
The presumption of revocation was completely overcome by
proof that the will had been in the custody and under the con-
trol of a third person rather than in the testator's possession.29
The meaning of the phrase "was in existence '30 was consist-
ently interpreted by the courts as meaning the physical exis-
tence of the will until the moment of the testator's death and its
subsequent loss or destruction."1 The courts, however, had diffi-
culty defining the term "fraudulently destroyed. 3 2 Originally,
the courts held that an actual fraud perpetrated against the tes-
tator was necessary to admit the will to probate.33 Requiring ac-
tual fraud meant that a will which was destroyed by negligence,
accident or unknown agent could not be admitted to probate.3 4
27. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961); 2A WAR-
REN'S HEATON ON SURROGATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed. 1982); H. HARRIS, ESTATES PRAC-
TICE GUIDE § 240 (1939).
As the court noted in Collyer v. Collyer, 110 N.Y. 481 (1888):
He who seeks to establish a lost or destroyed will assumes the burden of overcom-
ing this presumption by adequate proof. It is not sufficient for him to show that
persons interested in establishing intestacy had an opportunity to destroy the will.
Id. at 486. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400 (1961) where the court said that "the design of
the section is solely to- require proof that the lost or destroyed will offered for probate
was not destroyed by the testator animo revocandi." Id. at 409.
28. 2A WAREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed. 1982); 76 Am. JUR.
2d Trusts § 605 (1975).
29. See Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866); In re Bly, 281 A.D. 769, 118 N.Y.S.2d
340 (2d Dep't 1953); In re Levinsohn, 5 Misc. 2d 605, 160 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1957); In re Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 162 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County
1956).
See A. Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills, 24 NEB. L. REv. 283 (1945): "The same
presumption arises when it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will [not in
his possession] and it cannot be found after his death." Id. at 284.
30. N.Y. SUER. CT. ACT § 143 (McKinney 1921).
31. See In re Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 60 N.E. 442 (1901): "The fact in issue was
whether the instruments in question were physically in existence at the time of the death
of the testatrix." Id. at 169, 60 N.E. at 443. See also In re Millens, 291 N.Y. 613, 50
N.E.2d 1014, 36 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1943); 2 JEsSup-REDFtELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SUR-
ROGATES' COURTS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 1157 (1947); Note, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 221,
223 (1944); Tenney, The Probate of Wills Where Original is Missing, 23 N.Y. ST. BAR
BULL. 47, 50 (1951).
32. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 143 (McKinney 1921); J. Goldman, Practice Com-
mentary, N.Y. SuER. CT. PROC. ACT § 1407 (McKinney 1971).
33. See, e.g., Timon v. Claffy, 45 Barb. 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865), afl'd mem. sub
nom. Conray v. Claffy, 41 N.Y. 619 (1869). "Fraud . .. must consist of some deceitful
contrivance, device or practice to defeat the wishes ... of the testator." Id. at 446.
34. See In re De Groot, 2 Con. 210, 9 N.Y.S. 471 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1890);
5
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To overcome this inequity, the courts developed the concept of
"constructive fraud, 'a which was in harmony with the common
law test that the destruction only be without the testator's in-
tent to revoke.36 Thus, any loss or destruction of the will without
the knowledge or consent of the testator was held to be a fraud
upon the testator and thus a fraudulent destruction within the
meaning of the statute.3 7 Actual dishonesty was not necessary to
show constructive fraud, the issue being the agency of destruc-
tion, rather than the motive for destruction."
The definition of constructive fraud was further developed
by the New York Court of Appeals in the landmark case of In re
Fox.s9 There, the will, left with a custodian in Germany, was de-
stroyed during a bombing raid. The testator, after learning of
the will's destruction, expressed his intention to execute a new
will, but was unable to do so before he died. In a proceeding to
admit the destroyed will to probate under SCA 143, the contes-
tants claimed that the testator's knowledge of the will's prior
destruction was the same as an intentional revocation, thereby
foreclosing the will from being admitted to probate as fraudu-
lently destroyed. The court of appeals disallowed testimony on
the issue of subsequent oral adoption,40 holding that the proof of
Timon v. Claffy, 45 Barb. 438 (1865) aff'd mem. sub nom. Conray v. Claffy, 41 N.Y. 619
(1869).
35. See Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866).
36. See Note, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 182, 186 (1962); Note, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 168,
170 (1962); J. Goldman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1407 (Mc-
Kinney 1971).
37. See Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866) where the court said: "If so destroyed
it was done fraudulently as to him, and, in judgment of law, the legal results are the
same precisely as if it had continued in existence up to the time of [the testator's]
death." Id. at 656. See In re Dorrity, 118 Misc. 725, 194 N.Y.S. 573 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1922). The Dorrity decision contemplated destruction of the will by any means
which was out of the control of the testator. This was an expansion of an earlier interpre-
tation given constructive fraud in In re Reiffield, 36 Misc. 472, 73 N.Y.S. 808 (Sur. Ct.
Albany County 1901), which required that "some intervening human agency" have
caused the loss to find it was fraudulently destroyed. Id. at 474, 73 N.Y.S. at 810.
38. See Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866); St. John v. Putnam, 128 Misc. 714,
220 N.Y.S. 141 (Sur. Ct. Saratoga County 1927).
39. 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961).
40. "[T]he son's testimony as to the father's 'oral adoption' of the prior destruction
was inadmissible as hearsay or on general principles developed in the law of wills." Id. at
405, 174 N.E.2d at 502, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
See 2 JEssup-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATE'S COURTS IN THE STATE
OF NEW YORK § 1157 (1947): "The declarations of the testator are held not competent
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/9
LOST WILLS
fraudulent destruction required by SCA 143 went only to the
question of the testator's intention to revoke.4" As long as the
testator never intended to revoke his will, the statutory require-
ments were satisfied, regardless of how the will was destroyed.42
The holding in Fox was codified when SCA 143 was
amended by SCPA 1407."1 Because the term "fraudulently de-
stroyed ' 44 had been rendered unnecessary by the Fox decision,
the revised provision of the statute only requires that the court
decide whether the testator did, or did not, intend to revoke his
will.45
The second evidentiary requirement of SCA 143 was that
the will's provisions be clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two credible witnesses, a correct copy or draft being equivalent
to one witness." The requirements to prove contents have been
retained by SCPA 1407 with only a slight change in language.
evidence of the existence, loss or destruction of the will, nor execution. Nor are declara-
tions of the testators equivalent to a correct copy of the will." Id. at 456.
In Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552 (1901), the United States Supreme Court
spoke of the rule of evidence which disallows statements made by the testator as
hearsay:
If declarations of the deceased were admissible to attack, they would then of
course be admissible to sustain the will, and there would be apt to arise a contest
in regard to the number and character of conflicting declarations of the deceased
which he could neither deny or explain, and in the course of which contest great
opportunities for fraud and perjury would exist. The statutes as to wills were
passed, as we believe, for the very purpose of shutting out all contests of such a
character.
Id. at 581. For a further discussion of disallowance of the testimony of the testator's
statements, see In re Staiger, 243 N.Y. 468, 154 N.E. 312 (1926); In re Kennedy, 167
N.Y. 163, 60 N.E. 442 (1901); A. Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills, 24 NEB. L. REV. 283,
288 (1945).
41. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 409, 174 N.E.2d 499, 505, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405, 413
(1961). For a discussion of the Fox decision, see Note, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 182 (1961).
42. See In re Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961): "Proof
that the testator subsequently learned of the destruction of his will shows, if anything,
that he himself did not destroy it and, therefore, such proof, far from implying that the
will was not fraudulently destroyed, actually established that it was." Id. at 409, 174
N.E.2d at 505, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
43. 2A WARRN's HEATON ON SURROGATES' COURTS § 179 (6th ed. 1982).
44. N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 143 (McKinney 1921).
45. Fifth Report of the Temporary State Commission on the Law of Estates, No.
8.2. 5A, Leg. Doc. 19, at 795 (1966); J. Goldman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. SURR. CT.
PRoc. ACT § 1407 (McKinney 1971).
46. N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 143 (McKinney 1921).
47. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. SCA 143 required "its provisions" to
1983]
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Although the witnesses need not remember the exact language
used by the testator, "' they "must be able to testify to the sub-
stance of the whole will, so that it can be incorporated in the
decree, should the will be admitted to probate. 49 Each witness
must know the will's entire contents and each must agree on its
dispositive provisions.5 0
A third evidentiary requirement, explicit proof of the will's
due execution, was added to SCPA 1407.51 Although SCA 143
did not contain this provision, it was part of the proof required
at common law for probate of lost wills, 52 and as such, the courts
had always read it into the statute by implication." Due execu-
tion is usually proved by the testimony of the attesting witnesses
be proved while SCPA 1407 requires "all of the provisions" to be proved. See supra text
accompanying note 16.
48. H. HARRIS, ESTATES PRACTICE GUIDE § 240 (1939).
After existence of the will and its destruction have been established, the con-
tents must be proved. The statute provides that all of the provisions of the will
must be clearly and distinctly proved by each of at least two credible witnesses or
by one witness and a copy or draft of the will proved to be true and correct. In
this respect the present statute does not differ from the prior one. Knowledge of
the execution of the will is not knowledge of its contents. And while the witnesses
need not give the exact language of the will, but merely the substance, each of the
witness must testify to all the principal parts of the will. A copy of the will takes
the place of the second witness but the witness's supporting letter does not.
Id. at 534.
49. In re Musacchio, 146 Misc. 626, 627, 262 N.Y.S. 616, 618 (Sur. Ct. Madison
County 1933); See 2 JESSuP-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATES' COURTS IN
THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 1157 (1947); 2A WARREN'S HEATON, ON SURROGATES' COURTS §
179 (6th ed. 1982); H. HARRIS, ESTATES PRACTICE GUIDE § 240 (1939).
50. See In re Purdy, 46 A.D. 33, 61 N.Y.S. 430 (1st Dep't 1899); In re Yanover, 16
Misc. 2d 128, 182 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1959); In re Breckwoldt, 170
Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939).
51. N.Y. SURE. CT. PROC. ACT § 1407 (McKinney 1971) requires that the execution
of a lost or destroyed will must be: "Proved in the manner required for the probate of an
existing will .. " Id. § 1407(2). Accordingly, proof must be adduced that all the will
formalities have been met. These include:
1. Signature at the end thereof by the testator;
2. Signature by the testator either in the presence of each of the attesting wit-
nesses [or alternate procedure for acknowledging his signature to each of them];
3. Declaration by testator to each attesting witness that document is his will;
4. Presence of and signature by at least two attesting witnesses.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1981).
52. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
53. J. Goldman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1407 (McKin-
ney 1971).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/9
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to the original will. 4 Where it is shown that a will was executed
under an attorney's supervision, the proponent is entitled to a
presumption of due execution." Testimony as to the statements
made by a deceased person, however, are not competent proof of
either the existence or due execution of a will."
III. In re Kleefeld
A. The Facts
In Kleefeld,57 the testator executed a will prepared by his
attorney. The original will was retained in the attorney's files
and the testator was given a copy. The attorney predeceased the
testator and after the testator's death, the original will could not
be located. The proponent commenced a proceeding to admit
the testator's copy of the lost will to probate under SCPA 1407.
At trial, the proponent was able to establish the testator's
lack of intent to revoke the will by proving that the will had
been lost while in the possession of the attorney-draftsman.56
The proponent was able to establish due execution 59 through the
testimony of two witnesses who had attested to the original will.
Neither of these witnesses could testify to the original will's con-
tents" as they had not read it.
The testator's copy of the will and the testimony of the sec-
retary who had typed the original will were offered as proof of
contents." The secretary was able to identify the cover of the
will, her initials on the first page of the copy, and the type as
54. See 2 JEssuP-REDFIELD, LAw AND PACTICE IN THE SURROGATES' COURTS IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK § 1157 (1947): "The factum of the lost or destroyed will is estab-
lished as in the case of any other will by two subscribing witnesses." Id. at 452.
See H. HARIs, ESTATES PRACTICE GUIDE § 240 (1939): "The proponent must estab-
lish the due execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of the testator as well as
the absence of undue influence or fraud." Id. at 249.
55. See In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 22, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County
1977); In re Flasza, 57 Misc. 2d 347, 348-49, 292 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816-17 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1968).
56. In re Yanover, 16 Misc. 2d 128, 131, 182 N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County 1959). See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57. 55 N.Y.2d 253, 433 N.E.2d 521, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1982).
58. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
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that used by her typewriter. She could not, however, testify to
the contents of the will's substantive provisions as she had not
read it after it was typed.
The Surrogate's Court 2 held that the requirements of
SCPA 1407 had been met and admitted the lost will to pro-
bate.e3 The Surrogate's Court interpreted the proof of contents
provision of SCPA 140764 as only requiring proof that the sub-
mitted copy was a true and complete duplicate of the original,
and requiring no further proof of contents once the copy was
established. 5 It found that the secretary's testimony had suffi-
ciently identified the copy as a true and complete duplicate,
thereby proving the contents.6
B. Appellate Division
The appellate division affirmed without opinion the decree
of the Surrogate's Court. 7 The dissent, however, written by
Judge Murphy, argued that the evidence offered to prove con-
tents was insufficient to allow probate under SCPA 1407.68
Judge Murphy reasoned that since no testimony had been of-
fered to establish the contents of the original will, the proponent
had not proved that the copy offered for probate was in fact a
true copy of the original. 9 In such a case, according to the dis-
sent, the Surrogate should not have used the copy in lieu of one
witness.70 Moreover, even if the copy was shown to be a dupli-
cate of the original, the dissent, relying solely on the wording of
the statute, argued that SCPA 1407 still required that the con-
tents be corroborated by at least one witness whose testimony
62. A decree of the Surrogate's Court of New York County (Midonick, J.), admitting
to probate the Last Will and Testament of George Kleefeld, was entered on March 3,
1980. The opinion of the Surrogate's Court is unofficially reported in 183 N.Y.L.J.,
March 19, 1980, at 14, cols. 1-2.
A discussion of the Surrogate's decision is included in the court of appeals decision.
In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 257, 433 N.E.2d at 523, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
65. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 257, 433 N.E.2d at 523, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
66. Id.
67. In re Kleefeld, 79 A.D. 2d 567, 434 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1980).
68. Id. at 567-68, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 3:415
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/9
LOST WILLS
could independently prove the substantive provisions of the
will."1 According to Judge Murphy, since none of the witnesses
could offer such testimony, this part of the required proof was
also missing72
The dissent viewed prevention of admission of fraudulent
wills to probate as the main objective of SCPA 1407 .7 Thus, it
found that in a case like Kleefeld, where a fraudulent document
could easily have been substituted without detection by wit-
nesses who were ignorant of the original will's contents, the stat-
ute required that probate be denied.7'
C. Court of Appeals
i. Majority
The court of appeals, completely agreeing with the reason-
ing of the dissent, reversed the appellate division and disallowed
probate.7 In an opinion written by Judge Wachtler, the court
held that the express wording of SCPA 1407 was clear on its face
and thus left no room for judicial interpretation.76 According to
the majority, the statute clearly mandates that probate be de-
nied without the testimony of a witness who could establish the
actual contents of the will, independently of the submitted
copy.
7 7
The majority focused entirely on its view that, under SCPA
1407, the courts' primary responsibility was the prevention of
admission of fraudulent wills to probate and offered no opinion
on the consequences of requiring intestacy. Speaking of its in-
ability to relax the evidentiary requirements of the statute, the
71. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
75. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d 253, 433 N.E.2d 521, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1982). Judge
Wachtler wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Gabrielli
and Jones concurred. Judge Meyers wrote the dissenting opinion in which Judge Jasen
concurred. Judge Fuchsberg took no part in the opinion.
76. Id. at 259, 433 N.Y.2d at 524, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (citing 1 STATUTES, N.Y. LAW
§ 76 (McKinney 1971) which provides: "Where words of a statute are free from ambigu-
ity and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the legislative intents, resort may not be
had to other means of interpretation").
77. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 259, 433 N.E.2d at 524, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
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court said:
The legislative policy embodied in SCPA 1407 is designed to pre-
vent the probate of fraudulent wills. The policy will be subverted
if a will, such as the one at issue here, may be established and
admitted to probate merely on the basis of testimony regarding
the events surrounding the execution of the will rather than the
contents of the will itself. A strict construction of the statute in
question is therefore essential in order to insure that the legisla-
tive policy is properly effectuated. Moreover, SCPA 1407 is a lim-
ited statutory exception to the common-law Statute of Wills and
should be strictly construed for that reason alone."
In construing SCPA 1407, the majority relied primarily on
the wording of the statute and made no reference to prior case
law. Requiring that the provisions of SCPA 1407 be strictly con-
strued, probate was disallowed when the standard of proof re-
quired by the statute was not met.
79
ii. Dissent
In an opinion by Judge Meyers, the dissent found that pre-
vention of the inequities of requiring intestacy to be the primary
purpose of SCPA 1407 and the prevention of fraud of only sec-
ondary importance.80 Thus he said, "the issue for determination
is whether the copy presented bespeaks the testamentary plan of
the testator, not whether under the circumstances there could
have been fraud."81 To this end, he found that SCPA 1407 called
for a liberal construction, requiring only that the "conscience of
the court" be satisfied as to the sufficiency of the evidence.8 2 Un-
78. Id. at 260, 433 N.E.2d at 524, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 459, (citing 1 STATUTES, N.Y. LAW,
§ 301(a) (McKinney 1971)), which requires that "statutes in derogation of the common
law receive a strict construction."
79. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 259, 433 N.E.2d at 524, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
80. Id. at 261, 433 N.E.2d at 525, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 270, 433 N.E.2d at 442, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 465 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Meyers, J., dissenting). The dissent cited to a passage in In re Breckwoldt,
170 Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939) which in its entirety states:
[Proof of the lost will's contents] involves merely a clear and satisfactory
demonstration that the devolutionary plan which is promulgated is in fact that
which the testator himself intended. It is the conscience of the court which must
be satisfied upon this point. As the court reads them, the provisions of the statute
in this connection provide merely a rule of caution against too ready a conviction
on this issue and inhibit an expression of such conviction merely upon the unsup-
[Vol. 3:415
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like the majority, Judge Meyers relied primarily on prior case
law to support his opinion.8 3
The dissent found that the copy of the will and the secre-
tary's testimony were sufficient to prove contents of the will.84
Moreover, he found that the reciprocal will of the testator's wife,
evidence not referred to by the majority, should have been suffi-
cient to prove that the copy was authentic.8 5 The dissent, like
the Surrogate, 6 interpreted SCPA 1407 as requiring no addi-
tional proof of contents, once the authenticity of the copy was
established. s
Judge Meyers also saw error in the court of appeals' taking
the case at all.88 In deference to the competence of the Surrogate
he noted that "here, the conscience of an experienced and con-
scientious Surrogate has been satisfied . ..[He] found as a fact
that the contents of the copy were the same as the original will
and that the finding, having been affirmed by the Appellate Di-
vision, . . . is now beyond our review."
8 9
ported recollection of a single witness. This must be fortified either by corrobora-
tive testimony or by documentary demonstration of a satisfactory nature.
Whether either will be sufficient for the purpose must, in the nature of things, be
remitted to the decision of the trier of the facts. If, on the composite demonstra-
tion of the record, he is convinced that the documentary proof adduced is, in fact,
a correct draft or copy of the lost will, the statute requires only one witness in
addition.
Id. at 888, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 491. In re Breckwoldt was decided under N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT §
143 (McKinney 1921).
83. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 261-63, 433 N.E.2d at 525-26, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 460-
61 (Meyers, J., dissenting). The dissent refers to the following cases in support of its
opinion. They will be discussed infra in Part IV of this note. In re Grenacher, 174 N.Y.
504, 66 N.E. 1109 (1903); In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1977); In re Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County
1961); In re Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 162 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1956); In
re Bohnson, 203 Misc. 116, 115 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951); In re
Breckwoldt, 170 Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939).
84. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 262, 433 N.E.2d at 526, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Mey-
ers, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 267-69, 433 N.E.2d at 529-30, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65 (Meyers, J.,
dissenting).
86. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
87. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 433 N.E.2d at 426-27, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 461-
62 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 265, 433 N.E.2d at 527-28, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Meyers, J., dissenting).
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
IV. Analysis
In Kleefeld, the New York Court of Appeals retreated from
the liberal position towards the probate of lost wills that it had
taken in In re Fox.90 In that case the language of SCA 143 was
stretched to its logical limit to allow a lost will to be admitted to
probate, rather than require intestacy.9' Both cases reflect a sig-
nificant difference in attitude between the courts towards the
probate of lost wills. While the court in Fox was willing to ex-
pand the meaning of the statute to include the unique circum-
stances of a particular case,92 the court in Kleefeld was unwilling
to allow any interpretation on a case-by-case basis.
The cases may be substantively distinguished aside from
any differences in the makeup of the court. The issue in Fox was
the requirements to have a will admitted to probate as
"fraudently destroyed"9 after it was established that the will
was destroyed without the testator's intent to revoke it.4
Neither the contents of the Fox will nor the possibility that it
was a fraudulent document was in question. In Kleefeld, how-
ever, proof of lack of revocation was accepted" and proof of con-
tents was the issue.96 The Kleefeld court had to decide the
quantity and quality of evidence that would be acceptable to
prove contents in order to prevent fraudulent wills from being
probated.97
Although both courts were required to construe a statute,
the Kleefeld court had the advantage of making its decision
dealing with SCPA 1407 which had been amended to remove the
ambiguities found in SCA 143, the relevant statute in Fox." In
SCA 143 the meaning of the term "fraudulently destroyed" was
not at all clear and the courts had struggled to find a workable
definition until the term was finally dropped when the statute
90. 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961). See supra notes 39-45
and accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
95. N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 143 (McKinney 1921).
96. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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was amended by SCPA 1407. 9' SCPA 1407 is written in unam-
biguous terms that clearly require the testimony of two wit-
nesses or a true copy of the will and the testimony of one wit-
ness to prove contents of a lost will.100 It is therefore not
surprising that this is exactly what the court required in order to
admit a lost will to probate.
The court in Kleefeld clearly stated that its primary con-
cern °1 was prevention of admitting fraudulent wills to probate
and only when it has been assured that a fraud is not being per-
petrated will it concern itself with preventing the inequity of re-
quiring intestacy when a valid will was in fact executed.102 Thus
the majority held that when the standard of proof explicitly re-
quired by the statute is not met, probate will be denied.103
In many prior cases, wills had been lost under similar cir-
cumstances as those found in Kleefeld. The denial of probate in
Kleefeld is in accordance with the decisions in those cases.104 In
99. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
100. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT. § 1407(3) (McKinney 1971) provides that: "(3) all of
the provisions of the will are clearly and distinctly proved by each of at least 2 credible
witnesses or by 1 witness and a copy or draft of the will proved to be true and complete."
101. Notwithstanding the mandate of strict statutory construction required by
SCPA 1407, the court analyzed what it deemed to be the legislative policy without refer-
ence to any legislative statement of intent. See supra text accompanying note 81.
102. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
104. In the following cases the original will was lost while in the possession of the
attorney-draftsman. The testimony of the attorney as to the authenticity of a copy al-
lowed the lost will to be admitted to probate. In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d
992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1977); In re Graeber, 53 Misc. 2d 640, 279 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sur.
Ct. Erie County 1969); In re Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess
County 1961); In re Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 165 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County
1956); In re Juriga, 140 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1955); In re Bohnson, 203
Misc. 116, 115 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951).
In the following cases the original will was lost while in the possession of the attor-
ney-draftsman and was admitted to probate on the testimony of the attesting witnesses
who had read the will and were aware of its contents. See In re Granacher, 174 N.Y. 504,
66 N.E. 1109 (1903); In re Hughson, 97 Misc. 2d 427 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1978).
In the following cases the original will was destroyed in the possession of the testa-
tor. The copy retained by the attorney and the attorney's testimony as to its validity
allowed the will to be admitted to probate. In re Breckwoldt, 170 Misc. 883, 11 N.Y.S.2d
486 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939); In re Shlevin, 157 Misc. 40, 283 N.Y.S. 377 (Sur. Ct.
Erie County 1935).
See also In re Musacchio, 146 Misc. 625, 262 N.Y.S. 616 (Sur. Ct. Madison County
1933). Cf. In re Yanover, 16 Misc. 2d 128, 182 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County
1959) (testimony of attesting witnesses who had not read the will but only "glanced
15
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:415
Kleefeld, as in these prior cases, lack of revocation was estab-
lished by proof that the will was lost while in the custody of a
third party,105 and due execution was proved by the testimony of
the attesting witnesses. 0 6 Unlike Kleefeld, however, in the cases
where the court found the proof of contents offered acceptable,
the witnesses had read the will and could testify to the will's
substantive provisions, or could corroborate a copy as being a
true and complete duplicate of the original.10 7 This was, of
course, the determinative issue in Kleefeld, where no such testi-
mony was available to either establish the copy as authentic or
to corroborate its provisions.
In many of the cases cited by the dissent, the wills were lost
while in the possession of the attorney-draftsman. 0 8 In those
cases the testimony of the attorney that the copy was an identi-
cal version of the original will, without a recital of the provi-
sions, was accepted by the courts as proof of contents. 09 Since
the attorneys had drafted the original wills, such testimony was
considered appropriate. 10 Although the dissent regards those
through it" not clear and distinct enough to allow probate).
105. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
106. See In re Granacher, 174 N.Y. 504, 66 N.E. 1109 (1903); In re Hughson, 97
Misc. 2d 427 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1978).
107. See In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1977);
In re Graeber, 53 Misc. 2d 640, 279 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1967); In re
Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 1961); In re
Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 165 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1956); In re Juriga,
140 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1955); In re Bohnson, 203 Misc. 116, 115
N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951).
108. In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1977); In
re Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 1961); In re
Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 165 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1956); In re Bohn-
son, 203 Misc. 116, 115 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951).
109. In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1977); In
re Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 1961); In re
Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 165 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1956); In re Bohn-
son, 203 Misc. 116, 115 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951).
110. In re Utegg, 91 Misc. 2d 21, 396 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1977); In
re Eisele, 31 Misc. 2d 173, 219 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County 1961); In re
Haefner, 4 Misc. 2d 835, 165 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1956); In re Bohn-
son, 203 Misc. 116, 115 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951). See, e.g., In re
Granacher, 174 N.Y. 504, 66 N.E. 1109 (1903) where the court stated: "It is true that
instead of reciting its provisions the witness stated they were the same as those con-
tained in a paper which was shown him, to wit, the copy. But, this manner of proving the
contents of the original will was in no manner objected to." Id. at 507, 66 N.E. at 1111.
In Granacher, unlike Kleefeld, the witness who testified that the copy was the same as
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cases as supporting its position that a corroborating witness in
addition to the copy is not required,"' they are distinguishable
from Kleefeld, where the only witness available to testify to the
contents had typed, but never read, the original will. Therefore,
there was no testimony offered to prove that the copy was au-
thentic, in which case it could not be used in lieu of one witness.
In a case where no authentic copy of the original will has been
established, SCPA 1407 requires the testimony of at least two
credible witnesses to clearly and distinctly prove the contents. 2
Since the proponent in Kleefeld could not produce even one wit-
ness who knew the will's contents, the proof offered clearly fell
short of that required by the statute. Unfortunately, the only
person who could have offered the proper testimony, the attor-
ney-draftsman, predeceased the testator." 3
The dissent further argued that the reciprocal will of the
testator's wife should have been sufficient to prove contents. "'
Yet, even if the majority had accepted the reciprocal will to
prove the copy authentic, the statutory requirement of a cor-
roborating witness would not have been satisfied and probate
would still have been denied."' Although it may seem unneces-
sarily stringent to require corroboration after a copy is proven
authentic, the legislature deemed such a requirement essential
by retaining it in the revision from SCA 143 to SCPA 1407.116 If
the results of the Kleefeld holding prove to be unduly harsh, the
legislature may find it necessary to consider a further amend-
ment of SCPA 1407. For the present, the statutory language is
explicit 17 and mandates that probate be denied in cases like
Kleefeld.
the original had read the original will. Id.
111. In re Kleefeld, 44 N.Y.2d at 263, 433 N.E.2d at 526, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Mey-
ers, J., dissenting).
112. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
113. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 253, 433 N.E.2d at 522, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 457. In re
Hughson, 97 Misc. 2d 427 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1978) probate was allowed where the
original will was lost while in the possession of the attorney-draftsman who predeceased
the testator. Hughson can be distinguished from Kleefeld as the attesting witnesses had
heard the will read and were able to testify to the authenticity of the copy.
114. In re Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d at 267-69, 433 N.E.2d at 529-30, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 464-
65 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
115. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, in New York, original wills may be filed with
the Surrogate's Court for safekeeping.'118 The holding in Kleefeld
may have been motivated in part by the court's cognizance of
this service. If all original wills were filed with the Surrogate in-
stead of being retained by the attorney or the testator, the diffi-
culties inherent in probating a lost or destroyed will could be
entirely avoided.
V. Conclusion
In the probate of wills, a high degree of certainty and strict
adherence to statutory requirements has always been de-
manded." 9 "This extreme caution obviously arises from the es-
sential privacy of the act itself, which does not become the sub-
ject of proof until the mouth of the chief actor is closed by death
and the consequent ease and safety with which fraudulent wills
might be concocted and maintained."' 120 Where the original will
is missing and the certainty of its validity thereby diminished, it
is reasonable to require the same high standard of proof for ad-
mittance to probate as where the original is available.
The court in Kleefeld was not asked to determine whether
or not the possibility of fraud existed in this particular case.
Rather, it was asked to interpret SCPA 1407, a rule of evidence
which provides clear statutory requirements for admitting a lost
will to probate. As such, it is not a guideline for judicial inter-
pretation on a case-by-case basis.' 2 ' Were a court to relax the
118. See In re Hughson, 97 Misc. 2d 427 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1978), where the
court said: "By reason of this constant reminder to attorneys that original wills should be
filed in this court as the logical place for the safekeeping thereof, we have, as of Decem-
ber 1, 1978, 91,472 original wills in our safekeeping files." Id. at 431.
119. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
120. Kahn v. Hoes, 14 Misc. 63, 64-65 (Sup. Ct. Term 1895).
121. See Throckmorten v. Hold, 80 U.S. 552 (1901) where the Supreme Court, in
speaking about the rule of evidence which disallows, as hearsay, testimony of statements
made by the testator, has said:
The difficulty in regard to a rule of evidence is that it cannot be the subject of
enforcement or non-enforcement according to the exigencies of the particular case.
The rule mdst be general in its application. The rule must either permit or refuse
to permit the evidence . ..the statutes of all the States have very careful and
stringent provisions in relation to the making of wills, and the due proof of their
execution . . . to permit evidence of the nature given in the case tends ... to
break down the efficiency of the statutory provisions, and to render proof of the
execution of wills much less certain than was contemplated by the statutes.
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evidentiary requirements in one case to avoid the harsh results
of requiring intestacy, it could provide an opportunity for fraud-
ulent wills to be more easily admitted to probate and thereby
erode the legislative intent of SCPA 1407.122
Moreover, because original wills may be filed with the Sur-
rogate's Court for safekeeping, a procedure which would prevent
wills from being lost or destroyed, the policy of requiring strict
adherence to the evidentiary requirements for admitting a lost
or destroyed will to probate is completely justifiable.
Julia Kalmus
Id. at 580-81.
122. See In re Booth, 127 N.Y. 109 (1891), where the court said:
It has been the object of the statutes of the various states prescribing the mode in
which wills must be executed, to throw such safeguards around the transactions as
will prevent fraud and imposition, and it is wiser to construe the statutes closely,
rather than loosely, and so open a door for the perpretration of the mischiefs
which the statutes were designed to prevent.
Id. at 116.
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